RECENT CASES
BANKRUPTCY.
Section 4 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 provides that, "Any person
who owes debts, except a corporation, shall he entitled to the benefits
of this act as a ,oluntary bankrupt." In re Walrath,
175 ]ed. 243 (191o), raises the question, whether an inAre infants
fant is such a person. It is answered in the affirmative.
Entitled to
The infant in this case was liable on a judgment reAdjudication P
covered in an action of negligence. The Court held
this was a debt in respect to which the infant was under no disability.
That being so, lie is legally liable to pay it and can't possibly avoid it.
lie is, therefore, a person who owes debts and is entitled to the benefits of the act. The reasoning seems sound and the same decision has
been reached in the case of an infant engaged in business, who is
rendered by statute absolutely liable for debts contracted in the business. See In re Brice, 93 Fed. 942 (899).
On the other hand in cases where the only debts exhibited are ones
which the infant may disaffirm, it has been held, he is not such a person. In re Fidemnill'r, Jo5 Fed. 595 (igoo). This would seem to be in
line with the reasoning of our principal case.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
A statute provided that in case of loss of life by any person employed in a coal mine, occasioned by a failure to comply with the provisions of the act by the owner of the mine, a right of
Rights ofNon. action should accrue to the "widow" or lineal heirs of
the decedent for damages for the injuries%they shall
Resident
Aliens
have sustained. Act of June 2, 1891 (1Pa. Pamphlet
Laws, 207). It was held in a recent case that the word
"widow" did not
include a non-resident alien widow, and hence an
Italian subject, residing in Italy, could not recover under the statute
for the death of her husband. Dcbitulia v. Lehigh & Wilkesbarre Coal
Co., 174 Fed. (Pa.) 886 (9og).
The right of a non-resident alien to maintain an action under this
particular statute had never been decided, but the court considered
itself bound by decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court under
the similar statutes of April i5, 1851 (P. L. 674). and April 26, 185,
P. L 3o0. Deni v. Pennslvania R. R. Co., 181 Pa. 525 (1897); Maroz'ano v. Baltinore & Ohio R. R. Co., 216 Pa. 402 (1907). These decisions are based on the principle that the statutes of a State, in the
absence of an express provision to the contrary, apply only to persons
within the jurisdiction of the State. Wisconsin also supports this
doctrine. McMillan v. Spider Lake S. & L. Co., 1i5 Wise. 332 (1902).
The other jurisdictions in construing similar statutes hold that the
non-resident alien is within the hnguage and intent of the act. Davidson v. Hill, 2 K. I. 6o6 (igoi); Olf0oh v. Bush Co., 18z N. Y. 393
(i9o5); Mulhall v. Falon, 176 Mass. 266 (igno). These cases are
decided on the theory that the acts are to a large extent punitive, and
since they confer a benefit and not a burdcn. they should be held to
apply independently of residence or nationality. For a full discussion
of the principle involved, see 57 Am. Law Reg., 171.
(56s)

566

RECENT CASES

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Continued).
A good example of the curious cases which to-day arise, owing to
our novel methods of instruction and business, is that of the International Text Book Co. v. Pigg, 3o Sup. Ct. Rep. (19o9)
481. The case was decided on an appeal from the SuCorresponda- 5,chaols preme Court of Kansas, denying the right of the plaintiff to enforce an action of contract in the Kansas courts.
tngate4 ~
A brief resume of the facis and decisions are as follows:
Qommerce
The plaintiff is a Pennsylvania corporation engaged
in giving educational correspondence courses through the mails. In
various localities in the different States, it maintains "solicitor-collectors," whose duty it is to enroll pupils and collect the money they contract to pay from time to time in consideration of the instruction given
them. This money is forwarded to the home office of the company.
The expense of the office at Topeka was borne by the agent and not
by the company, which had no office in the State. The defendant
enrolled as a pupil in commercial law, and after paying a few instalments, repudiated the contract. We cannot help remarking, in passing,
that he must have been a very apt scholar, for with only some five
dollars' worth of instruction, his opinion that he could do this with
impunity was upheld in three courts before reversal
The Kansas statutes provided that a foreign corporation could not
do business in the State, nor seek relief in its courts without first
filing a paper setting forth its capital, amount of stock, par value, stockholders' addresses, and so forth. This had not been done by the plaintiff, who was consequently not allowed to bring suit on the broken
contracL
The Supreme' Court in reversing this position decided (r) that the
plaintiff was doing business in Kansas within the meaning of the statute; (2) a correspondence school, which solicits business in the various
States by means of agents, and furnishes instruction through the mails
to the pupils obtained by them, is engaged in interstate commerce; (3)
a statute of the nature of the one under discussion imposes a condition
upon a corporation of another State seeking to do business in Kansas;
and, as the business is interstate, that is a regulation of interstate commerce and a direct burden thereon. The statute was, therefore, held
unconstitutional, both as regards the filing of the certificate and the
prohibition of the right to sue in a Kansas court, the latter clause being,
in the court's judgment, so closely interwoven with the former as to
stand or fall with it.
See article in AmxcAx LAW REGIsm for April igo, entitled "The
Application of the Commerce Clause to the Intangible."
CONTRACTS.
A special contract was entered into by which the plaintiff agreed to
tear out an existing cellar under the house of the defendant and replace
same with a "perfect waterproof" one. When completed,
the cellar was found to leak, and the efforts of the plainBreach:
tiff to remedy the same proved unavailing. The plaintiff
Substantial
brought an action on the special contract and on the
Performzec"
common counts to recover the price. The court charged
eruit
that the plaintiff could recover on the common counts
for the value of the benefit which the defendant derived from such
performance on the part of the plaintiff. Merritt & Co. v. Layton, 7S
AtL (Del., x91o) 795.
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-On the question of the right of recovery for substantial performance
of a contract the courts are divided. Where performance on the part
of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to performance on the part
of t:e defendant, there can be no recovery on the contract. Under
the rigorous view of the common law, there could be no recovery
either on the contract or on the quantum meruit. Ellis v. Hamlin, 3
Taunt. 53; Munro v. Butt, 8 E. & B. 738. This hard rule has, however,
received modifications in many jurisdictions in this country. Where
the defects are only slight, performance of such is not considered as a
condition precedent and recovery may be had on the contract. Woodward v. Fuller, 8o N. Y. 3T2; Nolan v. Whitney, 88 N. Y. 648; Fitsgerald v. La Porte, 64 Ark. 34; Anderson v. Todd, 8 N. Dak. iS8. But
where the defects are substantial, there can be no recovery. Spence v.
Ham, 163 N. Y. 220; 57 N. E. 412; Denton v. Atchinson, 34 Kans. 438;
Champlin v. Rowley, 18 Wend. 187. A further modification exists in
some States, where the performance has been completed by the plaintiff in good faith and has proved beneficial to and has been accepted
by the defendant; though the plaintiff may not recover on the contract,
he may yet maintain a quantum meruit. McClay v. Hedge, z8 Iowa, 66;
Blood v. Enos, 12 Vt. 625; 26 Am. Dec. 363. The basis of such recovery
is the benefit conferred on the defendant. The right of recovery is in
no sense consensual, but is based on an obligation imposed by law; or,
in other words, is quasi-contractual. Where the defendant has derived
no benefit, there can be no recovery. Appleby v. Myers, L. R. 2, C. P.
651; Fildew v. Bisby, 42 Mich. 10D; 36 Am. Rep. 433; 3 N. W. 278;
Genni v. Hahn, 82 Wise. go; 5! N. W. io96. If the contract is so badly
performed as to be of no benefit to the defendant, there can be no
recovery, even for materials. Gazan v. Kirby, 8 Port. (Ala.) 253; Taft
v. Montague, 14 Mass. 281; 7 Am. Dec. 2q5. Nor will the fact that
performance has been expensive to the plaintiff give him a right to
more than the benefit conferred upon the defendant. Peacock v. Gleesen, 117 Iowa, 291. Under one view of the case, recovery on the common counts depends upon actual acceptance on the part of the owner.
Bozarth v. Dudley, z5 Vr. (N. J.) 5o4; Dermott v. Jones, 2 Wall. i;
but in Massachusetts, at least, where value has been conferred upon
the property of the owner and there has been no gross or fraudulent
violation of the contract, acceptance is presumed. Hayward v. Leonard,
7 Pick. 181; xg Am. Dec. 26&
The measure of damages may assist in determining tbe basis of recovery where the defendant has derived benefit. The attitude of some
courts fixes the amount of recovery as the contract price less the cost
of rendering the work equal to that contemplated by the contract. Gillman v. Hall, ii Vt. So; Palmir v. Co., 188 IlL 5o8; 59 N. B. 247; McKinney v. Springer,3 Ind. 59; 54 Am. Dec. 47o. And the party relying
on such substantial performance must prove the expense of supplying
such omissions. Spence v. Ham, supra. This measure of recovery may,
however, prove unjust if strictly enforced, for the defendant may derive substantial benefit from the work performed, yet the deduction of
the cost of making the work conform to the contract would wholly
deprive the plaintiff of compensation. Pinches v. Swedish Church, 55
Conn. 183. In other jurisdictions it is recognized that the right of
action is purely quasi-contractual, and the measure of damages is the
value of the benefit conferred, having reference to the contract price;
and this benefit is ascertained by deducting from the contract price*the
diminution in value by reason of the non-performance of the contract.
In Gillis v. Cobe, 177 Mass. 584; 59 N. B. 455, the court seemed inclined

568

RECENT CASES

CONTRACTS (Continued).
to a theory of unjust enrichment, but it is submitted that the true decision of the case recognizes the benefit to the defendant as the correct
rule. And the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show the value of
such benefit; this is not satisfied by mere proof of labor and materials
furnished. See, also, Page, Contracts, Vol. II, §i6o3.
Right of recovery, in any event, depends largely upon the good faith
of the plaintiff. If the breach is wilful, there can be no recovery. Van
Clief v. Van Vechten, 130 N. Y. 571 ; Gillespie v. Tool Co., 123 Pa. t8.
For an admirable discussion of the cases, see Clark: Architect,
Owner and Builder. (Macmillan, ixo$.)
A, the mother and sole heir of a decedent, entered into an agreement with B, the uncle of the latter. By this contract A promised to
give a share in the decedent's estate to C, an aunt of
Right of
the decedent, in consideration of B's joining in the adBeneficiary to ministration and in certain incidental litigation, withSue on a
out any charge for his services. It was held that C
Contract
could not enforce the contract against A, inasmuch as
she was not a party either to the contract or to the consideration. Mallalien's Estate, 42 Pa. Sup. Ct. ioi (igio).
The right of a third party to sue on a contract of which he is the
be.neficiary, is a question which is involved in hopeless confusion and
conflict in the different jurisdictions. The prevalent general rule is
that the beneficiary cannot enforce the contract, but in almost every
State the rule has been somewhat modified so that in cerain instances
he can maintain an action. The Pennsylvania doctrine is well settled.
The beneficiary cannot sue unless money or other valuable property has
been transferred to the promisor as the consideration for the promise
to make a payment to the third party. The promisor, it has been said,
has to be made, in effect, a trustee for the third party before the latter
can sue him. Hostetter v. Hollinger, 117, Pa. 6o6 (1888); Torrens v.
Campbell, 74 Pa. 470 (1873); Delp v. Brewing Co., 123 Pa. 42 (1888);
Vincent v. Watson, i8 Pa. 96 (1851). This "trust fund" doctrine is
peculiar to Pennsylvania and has been severely criticized as "an unwarranted extension of the law of trusts." is Han,. La-w. Rev. 780. However, that may be, it has the advantage of being a v.ell-settled doctrine
and comparatively simple. The only point of difficulty is whether in
a specific case this trust relation exists. The decisions are somewhat
in conflict on this, the tendency seeming to be to allow the beneficiary
a right of action when it is rather doubtful whether any trust has been
created.
Applying this doctrine to our principal ease, the Court properly
refused the beneficiary a right of action. There was no transfer of
money or trust poperty. but merely a perfomance of services by the
promisee for the promisor. It has long been settled that this is not
sufficient to allow the third party to sue. Edinundson v. Penny, x Pa.
334 (845).
In most jurisdictions where the beneficiary is allowed
to sue no distinction is made when the promise is based on the rendition of services rather than a transfer of property. Strong v. Marcy,
33 Kan. iog (1885); Buchanan v. Tilden, i58 N. Y. iog (z8g9).
The case would be decided the same way in most jurisdictions, as
it falls within what is known as the "sole beneficiary" class; i. e., where
the promisee enters into the contract solely to benefit the third party.
Whitehead v. Burgess. 61 N. J. 1.- 75 (I898) ; Irwin v. Lombard Univ.,
56 Ohio D. 9i (1897); Felch v. Taylor, 13 Pick. 133 (1832).
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CONTRACTS (Continued).
In the case of Morecraft v. .lllen, 75 Atli. 92o (N. J.), the defendant
was indebted to the plaintiff for board furnished prior to i9o4 under a
then existing contract. The parties at that time not being
Substitution
ahle to agree on amourt due under the contract, they
of New
adjusted their differences by another contract, whereby
Contract
the defeniatit obligated herself to pay the other a fixed
sum oi money 'n settlement of their mutual accounts.
The court held that the later contract, tnder the doctrine of novation,
was substituted for the earlier contiact and the rights of the parties
were controlled by its terms; the earlier contract being thereby extinguished. Therefore, the Statute of Limitations commenced to run only
from the inception of the substituted contract, and not from the time of
contraction of the original debts.
This case is in line with the well recognized doctrine that when
damages are unliquidated, a fair and final settlement or compromise
of a claim which has some legal merit, though less in amount than
was claimed, will be looked upon by the courts with favor on the principle, "Interest reipublicae tt sit finis litiumn." Specialty Glass Co. v.
Dalcy. 172 Mass. 46o; Morehouse v. Second National Bank. 98 N. Y.
5o3; Stony Creek Milling Co. v. Smalley, ii Mich. 32!; Connelly v.
Devoe, 37 Conn. 57o.

CRIMES.
A recent English case, The King v. Porter, K. B. 369 (ipto), de-

cides that an agreement to indemnify bail is an act tending to produce
Ag,.reement
ge
n

to Indemnify

Bail

a public mischief and makes the parties to it guilty of a
criminal conspiracy, regardless of the fact that the agree-

ment was not entered into with a view to the criminal's
absconding. The court refused to entertain the view

that such an agreement was a mere contract of suretyship and hence
involved no illegality. Their reason was, that if such were the case, the
bail would not be interested in getting the criminal before the bar of

justice, and criminals, particularly if possessed of means, would ab-

scond from justice.
There seem to be no cases in our books in point, and it is a more or
less recognized practice in this country. Our point of view must be
that the financial loss is sufficient to deter the criminal from running
away.
EQUITY.
A, honestly believing that C had obtained money from him under
false pretences. took a (teed to certain property from B, the father of
C, promising that in consideration of the giving of the
Relic Agalnst deed by B, he would not prosecute C on the criminal
Duress:
charge which he had contemplated. B was induced to
Stiflingof
give the deed by the threats of A to institute the prosCriminal
Prosecution
ecition and did so solely to save C.
Held: B is entitled to relief against the deed, for
though a party to an illegal contract, he is not in pari delicto, but acted
because of duress. Deed ordered canceled. Bell v. Ward, 74 Atl. (N.

J. xgog) is8.

The courts of law and equity have, in modern tines, recognized this
exception to the rigor of the rule that the law will leave the parties
to an illegal contract as it finds them and will neither enforce the
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contract, if executory, nor restitution if executed.

Medearis v. Gran-

berry, 38 Tex. Cir. App. 187; Swoe v. Jefferson Insur. Co., 93 Pa. 2p.
hi4 exception rests upon a doctrine of duress. "Courts of equity
will watch with extreme jealousy all such contracts and if there is
ground to suspect oppression will set the contract aside." Holt v.
Agnew, 67 Ala. 36o. And the same principle is applied in courts of
law to allow recovery of property transferred under such an illegal
contract. Mills v Hudgins, 24 S. E. (Ga.) 146. But the absence of evidence of oppression and submission thereto is fatal and the general
rule applies. Gregor v. Hyde, so C. C. A. 29o. It is now generally
recognized that threats of the prosecution of a near relative for an
alleged criminal offense, believed in by the petitioner, and inducing
him to change his legal position on a promise to stifle the prosecution,
will, if proved to be the cause of his action, constitute such duress
as will entitle him to relief in equity. Aimer. Garringe v Reed, 63
Pac. (Utah) 902; Barton v. McMillan, 42 So. (Fla.) 849; Gray v.
Freeman, 84 S. W. (Tex.) 1105; Davis v. Smith, 44 At. (N. H.) 253.
Eng.: Iflilliams v. Bayley, L. R. x H. L. 2oo; Davis v. London Itnsur.
Co., L R. 8 Ch. Div. 469. Some doubt seems to be placed on the above
proposition in New York. Haynes v. Rudd, 102 N. Y. 372 (j886), but
that case can hardly be supported in view of the later decision in
Schooner v. Lissauer, 107 N. Y. 1II (1887), and the language of Adarns
v. Irving National Bank, i6 N. Y. 6o6 (i88g).
In early law one could not avoid his deed on account of the duress
of another. Cro. Jac. 187. But the rule has been modified so as to allow
a father to plead duress of his child. Wagner v. Sands, r Freem. 351,
or a wife that of her husband, Bayley V. Clare, 2 Browne, 276. And
threats of imprisonment of a nephew made to an aunt have been held
duress of her. Henry v. State Bank, 107 N. W. (Iowa) 1034. But the
rule is not extended further. E. Stroudsburg Nat'l Bank v. Semple, 29
Pa. C. Ct. 245.
Whether there has been duress is a question of fact in each case.
The question is, was the person so acted upon by the threats as to
be bereft of the quality of mind essential to the making of a contract
and was the contract thereby obtained? Galusha v. Sherman, bi N. W.
(Wis.) 495. If so. and the threats are of imprisonment of a near
relative, the law will consider that sufficient duress to avoid the contract. First Nat'l Bank v. Payne, 42 S. W. (Ky.) 736; or to entitle
the party to relief in equity, Schoener v. Lissaner. supra; or to recover
money paid if contract be executed, Mills v. Hudgins, supra. And
threats antecedently made have even been held to color a conveyance
subsequently made so as to permit avoidance of the deed. Leflore
County v. Allen, 31 So. (M~iss., 1902) 298. In Pennsylvania it has been
held that a failure to show a promise was made not to prosecute, or a
promise to abandon the same, would be sufficient to defeat proof of
the duress necessary to relief. Moyer v. Dodson, 212 Pa. 344.
It is said tile question whether a crime has in fact been committed
is immaterial. In either case, the threat of criminal prosecution for
private purposes and abandoned for private ends, is opposed to the
policy of the law. Hcaton v. Norton State Bank, 52 Pac. (Kan., 1897)
876; Wloodham v. All'. 62 Pac. (Cal.) 398. But the fact that the party
making the threats acted in bad faith, never contemplating any actual
prosecution. has been held material in New York and sufficient f'; allow
recovery of money paid, though in that State there may be some question of the doctrine in absence of such added circumstance. Jaeger v.
Koenig, 62 N. Y. Supp. 803.
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If notes are given on an agreement to stifle threatened prosecution,
not only the execution thereof, but the payment, must be under the
fear oi such threats to enable recovery. Schultz v. Culbertson, 46 Wis.
313; IVoodham v. Allen, supra.
The opinion in the principal case is a valuable discussion of the
points involved and an able review of the authorities. •
MASTER AND SERVANT.
In the case of Ploof v. Putnam, 75 Atl. 277 (Vt.), defendant's
servant, who was in charge of defendant's island in Lake Champlain,
pursuant to his instructions to keep off trespassers, reWilful Tort
of Servant

fused to permit plaintiff to tie tp his siiiop to defendant's

(lock during . storm, by reason of which the sloop and
her cargo were lost and plaintiff and his family were
thrown into the sea and injured.
The courts found as a matter of law that this act was within the
apparent scope of the servant's authority, and that though ordinarily it
would have been a proper act, under existing circumstances, it was
unlawful. The court then stated the following rule of law: That a
master is liable for the act of his servant, although it is wilful and
malicious, when it is done in furtherance of the master's business
and within the scope of the servant's employment. The test is not the
character of the act itself, nor whether it was done during the period of
employment, but whether if was done to carry out directions of the
master, express or implied, or to effect some purpose of the servant
alone. In other words, if the servant cast off the rope intending thereby
to carry out his instructions and perform his duty as caretaker, of the
property, the defendant is liable; if he cast it off not for this purpose,
but only to serve some purpose of his own, the defendant is not liable.
This case is in line vith the weight of authority; see Rounds v. D.
& L. R. R., 64 N. Y. 129 (1876) ; Hoffman v. N. Y. C. R. R., 87 N. Y.
25 (i8i) ; Brennan v. Merchant & Co., 205 Pa. 258 (19o3); Rochester
v. Bull, 58 S. E. 756, 1907 (S. C.) ; Columbus R. R. v. Woolfolk, 58 S. _.
52, i9o7 (Ga.).
But see the following cases in which the master was held liable for
wilful and wanton injury of a third person by the misuse by the servant
of an instrument entrusted to his care. Tolcdo, Wabash & St. R. R.
v. Harmonl, 47 Ill. 298 (i86); Texas & P. R. R. v. Scoville, 62 Fed.
790 (1894).

In McCall v. Wright. 9T N. E. (gio), 516, the question arose on
appeal, as to the right of an employer to an injunction to restrain an
employee from entering the employ of a rival concern,
.laster's
Rght where the employee was in a position of great responsito enforce
bility, thoroughly familiar with all phases of his emContract
of
ployer's business, in possession of valuable trade secrets
Employment
Inlunctlon :"• and bound by contract not to enter the service of other
similar concerns for six years.
Tn this case the contract of employment set forth that
the defendant was to perform such duties as were assigned him, and to
further the business of his employer to the best of his ability, in return for which he was to receive a very large compensation. The
contract was terminable, at the option of the employer, on thirty days'
notice, and contained an express provision that the defendant was not
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to enter the employ of any rival concern for six years, the period of
the contract, and that if he did so the employer should be able to
restrain him by injunction. In direct violation of this agreement, the
employee, a few months after making it, left the plaintiff's employ and
became president of a corporation in a similar line of business. Alleging irreparable damage, the former employer asked for and obtained
an injn.ction to restrain him, from which order the defendant appealed.
There seems to be little doubt that such a contract, though to a
certain extent in restraint of trade and competition, is not against public
policy and is enforceable at law. Such agreements have been frequently
upheld when incorporated with agreements for the sale of a business.
Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, io6 N. Y. 473 (1887) ; Wood v. Whitehead Bros. Co., 165 N. Y. 545 (igoi), and also in the case of employees
in Magnolia Metal Co. %:Price, 72 N. Y. Sup. 792 (19o) ; Mutual MIilk
Co. v*.Heldt, io5 N. Y. Sup. 661 (19o7); Vllean Detinning Co.v. American Can Co., 67 Atd. Rep. 3.39 (19o7). It was urged, however, in support of the defendant's position, that there was no mutuality in the contract, since it was terminable at the option of the employer. It would
seem, however, that there was not much basis for this cnitcntion, since
there was a good consideration for the contract, and as far as the employer was concerned, he had not exercised his option; nor was it even
shown he ever intended to. The court, having conic to the conclusion
thit, on the above reasoning. the'contract was a valid one, affirmed the injunctionon the ground, principally, that irreparable injury to the plaintiff, for which no adequate remedy seemed to exist, had been shown.
So it would seem that in the case of every such contract, if the employer
can convince the court of the inadequacy of other remedies to compensate for the loss he will sustain by his employee's deserting his service
for that of a rival, to whom he carries an intimate knowledge of the
former's methods of business, which will cause irreparable damage to
ihe plaintiff, a court of equity will afford him relief by injunction.
NEGLIGENCE,
The defendant telegraph company negligently transmitted plaintiff's
prepaid message to addressee as a collect message, charges being again
Telegrapb
paid by addressee. The message contained an offer to
co,1"payt
sell goods and the plaintiff alleged the offer was not
Loss of
accepted for the sole reason that the addressee was
Cont 'act
he
Natural and
"huffed" at receiving a collect message from the plaintiff
Probable
and accordingly refused to cuntract, with him, to the loss
Cause of
of the plaintiff. Held: The plaintiff is entitled to reNegligence
cover for damages arising from this form of negligence
of a telegraph company as well as from any other form. But the direct
cause of'the loss here was addressee's independent exercise of his right
to reject the offer of the contract, and as it cannot be proven with any
degree of certairty that the failure to accept was caused by the fact
that the message was sent collect, the relation of legal cause and effect
is not sufficienjtly established between the negligence and the damage
to allow plaintiff to recover. Judgment given for cost of the message
alone. Hall v. 1f7estcrit Union Telegraph Co., 51 So. (Fla., igio) 81g.
The precise question does not appear to have been before the courts
before. But where A has sent a telegraph message to B offering the
contract. which message the company failed to deliver, it generally has
been held that A may rot recover compensatory damages, for his loss
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is contingent upon the acceptance of the contract by B-upon the independent will of the addressee, B-and no recovery is given for a contingelt loss. Beatty Lumber Co. v. IVestern Union Tel. Co., 52 W. Va.
410 (19o3).
Moreover, if ihe jury find as a matter of fact that if the
telegram had been received, the addressee would have accepted the
offer, the case is unaffected. Smith v. Western Union Tel. Co., 83 Ky.
1o4. The court said in this case, "What a person might or would have
(lone in a certain event is not the proper subject of a special finding
and will not be considered." And the same position is takn in McCaul
v. l'estern Union Tel. Co., 45 Amer. R. 496. On the other hand, in some
cases the courts have reviewed the evidence, and being convinced the
contract would .have resulted, allow a recovery of expectable profits.
Ilcstern Union TH. Co. v. Wiilhelm, 67 N. W. (Neb.) 870; Kemp v.
l'estern Union Tel. Co., 44 N. W. (Neb.) 66t. And evidence that a
physician who had been summoned, i. e., offered a contract, required a
guaranty of his fee before responding, was excluded in Western Union
Tel. Co. v. licnderso', 7 So. (Ala.) 419. In Pennsylvania it has been
held the complaint must allege that had the message been delivered,
the addressee would have accepted the contract offered. Ferguson v.
Anglo-Amer. Tel. Co., x5r Pa. 211. This intimates that the action for
damages for loss of expectable profits might be maintained if allegations
and proof establish that the contract would otherwise have been made.
The principal case indicates that the Florida courts are in accord
with the former line of cases, holding that when the contingency of the
acceptance depends upon the independent will of the addressee of the
message, it was a natural step to hold where the message was delivered,
that the fact that its non-acceptance depended upon the defendant's

negligence in sending it "collect" was too conjectural and improbable
even to go to the jury. Being received and not accepted, it would be
an inconsistent position to allow a jury to guess that the reason therefor
was the indignation of the addressee at having to pay the charges,

when not being received, the same court would have refused to hear
evidence that otherwise it would have been accepted.

PUBLIC COMMISSIONS.
Two recent cases defining the extent of the liability of acts of public
commissioners to collateral attack, are found in the recent advance

sheets. In Emmons v. U. S. (C. C. Oregon, i9og) the
Collateral
Attack on
Decllon of
Public

Commissions

g"neral proposition was laid down that the Land Department of the United States, in passing on questions of fact
within the scope of its jurisdiction over the sale and
disposal of public lands, acts judicially, and its judgments
are hinding and final, and preclusive of matters adjudi-

cated in other proceedings.

This principle has been

established before. Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 144 U. S. 636.
In New Jersey, in Attorney General v. Sooy Oyster Co. (76 Ali. Rep.
211), i9io, the court distinguished between generic and specific jurisdiction, and declared that the lack of the- former only is of avail in
collateral attack. However. it was only by a divided court that it was
held that a decision that certain riparian land was not oyster beds, under
the statute empowering them to grant such land as was not natural
oyster beds, was an exercise of their specific jurisdiction, which must
be attacked directly. Half of the court agreed with Swayze, J., that
their generic jurisdiction was "not to grant oyster beds;" and that it
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would be in opposition to public policy-in that the practical effect of a
contrary decision would be to establish the validity of the grant for all
tinie-for it would be inequitable for the State in chancery to take away
the subject of such grant, after it had been improved by the grantee.
The result of such reasoning would be to take away from the public
commissions created by the legislatures of our various jurisdictions that
final authority in the decisions of questions of fact relating to the public
domain, which the legislatures apparently, from the acts creating them,
intended to vest in them.

